Product Description

In the later decades of the 20th century, Africa plunged into political chaos. States failed, governments became predators, and citizens took up arms. In When Things Fell Apart, Robert H. Bates advances an explanation of state failure in Africa. In so doing, he not only plumbs the depths of the continent's late-century tragedy, but also the logic of political order and the foundations of the state. This book covers a wide range of territory by drawing on materials from Rwanda, Sudan, Liberia, and Congo. Written to be accessible to the general reader, it is nonetheless a must-read for scholars and policy makers concerned with political conflict and state failure.

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #79593 in Books
• Published on: 2008-02-18
• Original language: English
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Paperback
• 216 pages

Review
"Bates has laid bare the reasons that violence has been so prevalent in Africa in the late 20th century. It was not ethnic divisions, nor simply available resource wealth, though both are implicated. Rather, African states, buffeted by adverse impacts of globalization, lacked the revenues to administer their fractious societies. When predation and corruption seemed to offer greater rewards than providing stable administration, state leaders undermined their own economies, eventually provoking conflict and rebellions. Bates's compact account is rich in examples and insights, and supported by the data. He leaves us with a powerful message -- order depends on providing state leaders with the incentives to provide good governance."
-Jack Goldstone, George Mason University

"An economist who has done development work for several governments and organizations, and much field work in Africa, Bates...constructs a theory of what happened in Africa in the twilight of the 20th century, drawing on the theory of games. Rwanda, Sudan, Liberia, and Congo are his case studies as he looks at the depth of the tragedy, the logic of political order, and the foundations of the state."
Book News, Inc.

"What accounts for the economic and political collapse of so many African states since independence?...Bates argues that small government revenues in what are relatively poor states, and their heightened volatility after the mid-1970s, shortened the time horizons of politicians and lessened their incentives to act for the public good....Bates concludes that the wave of democratization of the last two decades is unlikely to promote political stability since incumbents will react to this new threat to their hold on power with more corruption and violence."
Foreign Affairs

Customer Reviews

an interesting model with a hodgepodge of evidence
In this short book (174 pages of text; 139 if you skip the quantitative appendix), Bates argues that state failure stems from predation on the part of the central government. His model, to put it briefly (and inadequately), is that governments can either take revenues from the people (1) in the form of taxes while providing services (such as security) or (2) in the form of predation. As long as the benefits of the former outweigh the latter (for example, when a government is assured of staying in power for a long time), the government will maintain security. However, if the long run is less certain, the government may sacrifice steady long-term gains in favor of larger short-term gains from predation.

Bates starts with an extended, insightful exposition of this metaphor (Chapter Two). Then he characterizes the conditions that prevailed prior to collapse in many African countries in chapters three (political trends), four (bad economic policies), and five (tensions between groups in the countries). In Chapter Six he describes the state failures. The conclusion sums it up, and the appendix gives some statistical evidence (the rest of the evidence is anecdotal or - Bates's preferred term - narrative).

Overall I found the book slow reading (despite its brevity) and not as coherent as I'd have liked. The basic model is useful but I often found it unclear in the succeeding chapters how the many pieces of narrative evidence fit into the model. The clearest example of this was in Chapter Five, where three models of subnational tensions were presented followed by several examples that did not clearly fit the models.

Further, the form of narrative evidence (lots of different examples from various countries) felt less effective to me than either a detailed case study of one example or systematic statistical evidence. (If I had pre-existing intimate familiarity with the national histories, this would have been less of an issue) The statistical annex provides the latter but deserved more space: some integration of statistical findings with narrative evidence might have worked better. (As it was, the statistical annex left me with a number of clarifying questions.) Bates argues that he distinguishes himself from other work in the area by deriving his hypothesis from a theory rather than highlighting empirical "findings" (p8-9).* And yet Bates - in his empirical appendix - reports atheoretical findings such as the increasing likelihood of disorder over time (despite controlling for changes that should drive the changing likelihood) - p171-173. Finally, Bates doesn't devote any time to states that didn't experience state failure and why or how they differed, nor to rival theories and how they fare in light of the national narratives.

As a novice considering whether to read a book like this, the ideal would be to read at least two reviews: one from an expert (who can opine as to how this fits - or doesn't - with existing knowledge) and one from a novice (who can tell how this may read to another novice). I fall in the latter category. In the former, Chris Blattman (an economics professor in Yale's political science department) blogged, "It's short, it's readable, and it's intelligent. Normally if I get just two of the three, I'm thrilled" [1]. A political scientist I know called it an "excellent primer." And Nicholas Van De Walle (author of the highly esteemed African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979-1999) wrote a brief review for Foreign Affairs, summarizing and concluding that "Bates paints in broad brushes and ignores the states in the region, such as Botswana, Cape Verde, and Mauritius, that have not followed this script but actually enjoyed stability, economic growth, and reasonably democratic politics" [2].

Perhaps this volume is most readable to the already initiated. But it is short and imparts a significant amount of valuable information; I recommend Chapters 2 and 6.

[1] Chris Blattman's blog [easily searchable on-line], "When things fell apart," 19 July 2008.

[2] Nicholas Van De Walle, "Africa," Foreign Affairs, May/June 2008.

* I assume by this he means an explicit, chapter-long theory. Other work I've read in this area, by Collier or by Miguel, clearly has a theoretical basis even if not as formally stated as Bates's.

serious doubts of African governments
Robert Bates's When Things Fell Apart raises serious doubts of African governments. Bates, a professor of gov­ern­ment at Harvard, reviews the failures of African governments over the past few decades, demonstrating a strong link between the push for democratization and the failure of governments to deliver the goods. "Electoral competition and state failure go together," he shrewdly observes, noting that in numerous Afri­can ­countries--­Rwanda among ­them--­where democratic re­forms threatened established re­gimes, political disorder resulted. Certainly in Kagame's view, three and a half decades of majority rule appear to have led inexorably to genocide. Bates's argument, however, is nuanced. He sug­gests that repression may pre­vent ­disorder--­and thus deliver Africans physical ­security--­but without delivering prosperity. "Poverty," he concludes, "becomes the price of security."